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THE PROJECT BIOSHIELD PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA: AN IMPETUS FOR THE 
MODERNIZATION OF PROGRAMMATIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 
David M. Shea*
Abstract: Passage of the Project BioShield Act of 2004 evinced an ex-
ecutive and legislative desire to increase government-controlled labora-
tory space dedicated to studying dangerous pathogens. Pursuant to this 
Act, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) awarded generous con-
struction grants to research universities nationwide. Unsurprisingly, sit-
ing disputes have subsequently arisen over the placement of several of 
these proposed laboratories in densely populated areas. Because NIH 
chose not to complete a programmatic environmental impact statement 
(PEIS), the potential litigation endgames are suboptimal. This fuels a 
larger debate over the relevance of PEISs in general in light of their 
recognized value but sporadic invocation. This Note uses a game theory 
model to argue that initial completion of a thorough PEIS would have 
led NIH to propose laboratories in areas with comparatively lower popu-
lation densities. This preferable but currently unattainable outcome 
demonstrates the need for reform. To that end, this Note concludes 
with recommendations for legislative, executive, and judicial moderni-
zation of PEISs. 
 The primary hazards to personnel working with Biosafety Level 4 agents 
are respiratory exposure to infectious aerosols, mucous membrane or broken 
skin exposure to infectious droplets, and autoinoculation. All manipula-
tions of potentially infectious diagnostic materials, isolates, and naturally 
or experimentally infected animals, pose a high risk of exposure and infec-
tion to laboratory personnel, the community, and the environment. 1
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2005–06. 
1 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention & Nat’l Insts. of Health, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Labora-
tories 14 (4th ed. 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/pdfªles/4th%20BMBL. 
pdf [hereinafter Biosafety Guidelines]. 
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[The Rocky Mountain Laboratories] campus is located in rural western 
Montana, well removed from major population centers. The location of the 
laboratory reduces the possibility that an accidental release of a biosafety 
level-4 organism would lead to a major public health disaster. 2
Introduction 
 Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) organisms, including Ebola and several 
other African, Asian, and South American viral hemorrhagic fevers, are 
those determined by the Department of Health and Human Services to 
be “[d]angerous/exotic agents which pose high risk of life-threatening 
disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections; or related agents with un-
known risk of transmission.”3 While these pathogens cause the most 
dangerous diseases known to man,4 the amount of laboratory space 
devoted to their study is comparatively small.5 In the wake of the Sep-
tember 2001 terrorist attacks and the October 2001 anthrax letter 
scares, President George W. Bush announced a major initiative— Pro-
ject BioShield—to swiftly fund additional BSL-3 and BSL-4 (BSL-3/4) 
laboratory space across the country.6
                                                                                                                      
2 Memorandum from the Director of Div. of Intramural Research, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases Div. of Intramural Research 2 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http:// 
www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/NIAIDmemoRMLsiting.pdf. This memorandum 
was released by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in response 
to an environmental group’s request for information under the Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). See Letter from Paul A. Marshall, Freedom of Information Co-
ordinator, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, to James Miller, President, Friends 
of the Bitterroot 2 ( Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Bio- 
labdocs/NIAIDmemoRMLsiting.pdf. 
3 See Biosafety Guidelines, supra note 1, at 53. Biosafety levels one through four, 
from lowest to highest required security measures, are assigned to microbiological labora-
tory facilities based upon the types of diseases studied there. Id. at viii. 
4 Less-secure BSL-3 laboratories are allowed to handle organisms which cause diseases 
as serious as anthrax, tularemia, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), acquired im-
munodeªciency syndrome (AIDS), smallpox, and plague. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 
National Emerging Infectious Disease Laboratories, Boston app. 2 (Oct. 2004) (on 
ªle with author) [hereinafter BUMC DEIS]. 
5 While the BSL-1 designation may be assigned to “undergraduate and secondary 
training and teaching laboratories” with no more safety measures than “a sink for hand-
washing,” there are currently only four operational BSL-4 laboratories nationwide. Bio-
safety Guidelines, supra note 1, at 11–12; Nat’l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Dis-
eases, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The Need for Biosafety Laboratory 
Facilities (Feb. 2004), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/Factsheets/facility_construction.htm. 
6 See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 39 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 109, 113 ( Jan. 28, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 State of the Union 
Address]; see also discussion infra Part I.A. To raise public support for this funding initia-
tive, President Bush warned the American public of the extreme dangers posed by BSL-
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 In September 2003, Boston University Medical Center (BUMC) 
received $120 million toward the construction and operation of a 
BSL-3/4 research facility, after being selected as one of nine institu-
tions to be awarded generous federal grants under Project BioShield.7 
Many local politicians supported the proposed project,8 based partly on 
the government’s assurance that the risk involved is “negligible.”9
 Despite this self-serving administrative assurance, recent media 
coverage has documented numerous scenarios involving non-negligible 
amounts of risk at existing BSL-3/4 laboratories, including: the poten-
tial spread of pathogens due to power loss;10 the release of pathogens 
inside a laboratory;11 the misplacement of pathogens;12 the release of 
pathogens during transit;13 and the accidental transmission of patho-
gens to laboratory workers.14 One can easily conceive of a disaster sce-
nario in downtown Boston rivaling or surpassing the 2002 SARS epi-
demic in Southeast Asia.15 This Note does not take the radical view that 
accidents of this nature are certain to occur if the proposed BUMC 
laboratory is built; rather, it assumes that the siting of a BSL-3/4 labora-
                                                                                                                      
3/4 organisms, stating: “It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this 
country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.” See 2003 State of the Un-
ion Address, at 115. 
7 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAID Funds Construction of Biosafety Labora-
tories (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2003/ 
nblscorrect21.htm; see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
8 See Michael Blanding, Fear in the Air, Boston Mag., June 2004, http://www.boston-
magazine.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/article.view/articleID/421a74a5-106d-44d3-b752-01e 
93a75b1ef (stating that Mayor Thomas Menino, Governor Mitt Romney, and Senator Edward 
Kennedy have all pledged their support). 
9 See BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 4-6 to 4-14; see also discussion infra Part V.B. 
10 See Marc Santora, Power Fails for 3 Hours at Plum Island Infectious Disease Lab, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 20, 2002, at B1. Fortunately, a potential disaster was averted when quick-
thinking workers at the center “sealed the [laboratory] doors with duct tape.” Id. 
11 See Dan Vergano & Steve Sternberg, Anthrax Slip-Ups Raise Fear About Planned Biolabs, 
USA Today, Oct. 14, 2004, at A11. 
12 See Rick Weiss & Joby Warrick, Army Lost Track of Anthrax Bacteria, Wash. Post, Jan. 
21, 2002, at A1. 
13 See Associated Press, Virus Box Explodes at Ohio FedEx Site, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 2003, at 
A31 (“The package, from the Ohio Department of Health and being sent to . . . the Uni-
versity of Texas, held brain and kidney tissue from a bird that had tested positive for the 
[West Nile] virus . . . .”). 
14 See, e.g., David Brown, SARS Cases in Asia Show Labs’ Risks, Wash. Post, May 29, 2004, 
at A1 (stating that a Russian scientist working on Ebola “died after sticking herself . . . with 
a contaminated needle.”); Avram Goldstein, Scientist Is Watched for Signs of Ebola, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 20, 2004, at B2 (reporting that an Army scientist was placed in isolation after 
accidentally sticking herself with a needle while working on mice infected with Ebola); 
Steve Vogel, Army Studies Safety at Fort Detrick Lab, Wash. Post, May 16, 2000, at B3. 
15 See Brown, supra note 14 (detailing the unsettling innocence with which an out-
break’s initial carriers can spread SARS, a BSL-3 pathogen). 
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tory in such a densely populated area would, contrary to the govern-
ment’s assertion, necessarily constitute some nontrivial amount of risk.16
 Two local groups—Alternatives for Community & Environment 
(ACE)17 and Safety Net18—share this assumption, including it among 
their claims in various response letters written during public com-
ment periods throughout the federal and state environmental review 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Alternatives for Cmty. & Env’t/Safety Net, Which One Does Not Belong? (Mar. 12, 
2004), http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/WhichOneDoesNotBelong3-12-04.pdf. 
Statistics compiled by a community environmental group cite the local population density for 
the proposed BUMC laboratory as being more than four times higher than that of any of the 
four BSL-4 laboratories already in existence. See id. 
Where many are familiar with Love Canal, Three-Mile Island, and the Exxon-Valdez 
oil spill, the government’s contention that no meaningful risks would be posed by the 
transportation and study of Ebola and SARS viruses in a densely populated, urban 
neighborhood rings hollow. Moreover, documents and regulations exist which belie the 
executive branch’s professed view on the innocuousness of BSL-3/4 laboratories. See, e.g., 
42 C.F.R. § 73.17 (2005) (tacitly recognizing the possibility of the “theft, loss, or release,” of 
a selected agent or toxin by listing agencies’ notiªcation requirements in such scenarios); 
Ofªce of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Report 
on Select Agent Security at Universities 1–3 (Mar. 2004) (documenting “serious 
weaknesses” at all eleven universities studied in preventing unauthorized entry and re-
moval of infectious substances from university “hot labs”), available at http://org.hhs. 
gov/oas/reports/region4/40402000.pdf. 
17 ACE, based in Roxbury, Massachusetts, “works in partnership with low income 
communities and communities of color to achieve environmental justice.” Letter from 
Alternatives for Cmty. & Env’t/Safety Net, to Valerie Nottingham, Chief, Envtl. Quality 
Branch, Nat’l Insts. of Health 1 (Dec. 23, 2004) (on ªle with author) [hereinafter Decem-
ber ACE Letter]. 
EPA deªnes environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement 
of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the devel-
opment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and poli-
cies.” EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/ 
index.html (last visited May 4, 2006). The environmental justice movement has gained 
recognition over the last few decades as it has become apparent to many that communities 
with higher percentages of minority and low-income populations are often asked to bear 
disproportionate numbers of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs). See, e.g., Richard J. 
Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 
87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 796–806 (1993); Lawrence E. Susskind, A Negotiation Credo for Con-
troversial Siting Disputes, 6 Negotiation J. 309, 309–10 (1990). Importantly, LULUs such as 
nuclear power plants and toxic waste dumps are often associated with heightened levels of 
environmental and health risk. See Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Envi-
ronmental Racism and Biased Methods of Risk Assessment, 7 RISK 55, 57 (1996). 
18 Safety Net describes itself as being “comprised of public housing residents and oth-
ers in Roxbury who came together in 2000 to develop a voice and vision for a sustainable 
Roxbury and equitable metropolitan development.” December ACE Letter, supra note 17, 
at 1. Because the proposed BSL-3/4 laboratory will be “located near their densely popu-
lated urban neighborhood,” members of Safety Net believe that it “will have adverse envi-
ronmental, health, safety, and economic impacts.” Id. 
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processes.19 As of the date of publication, these groups were involved 
in an ongoing lawsuit challenging the ªnal state environmental certi-
ªcation.20 This Note foregoes analysis of the local matters and focuses 
instead on the legal challenges surrounding the federal environ-
mental certiªcation once it becomes ªnal, because these ªndings will 
be more relevant to other proposed laboratory sites.21 In addition, if 
the state litigation were to block the proposed BUMC BSL-3/4 labora-
tory, the analysis in this Note will remain relevant should the federal 
government choose to redirect its muniªcence. 
 While the local groups’ missives offer a potential road map for 
future Project BioShield litigation, they also raise pertinent questions 
about the future of environmental review in general. In particular, 
one of the environmental plaintiffs’ central claims—that the govern-
ment failed to complete a programmatic environmental impact state-
ment (PEIS)22 for Project BioShield as a whole before choosing spe-
ciªc locations for the proposed BSL-3/4 laboratories23—is a frequent 
point of contention in environmental litigation.24 Indeed, uncertain-
                                                                                                                      
19 See, e.g., December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 2–14 (commenting on nine “prob-
lems” with the federal environmental review); Letter from Alternatives for Cmty. & 
Env’t/Safety Net, to Ellen Roy Herzfelder, Sec’y, Mass. Executive Ofªce of Envtl. Affairs 1–
2 (Nov. 5, 2004) (commenting on eight “inadequacies” in the state environmental review), 
available at http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/FEIRcommentsweb.pdf. 
20 See Amended Complaint, Arruda v. Trs. of Boston Univ., No. 5-0109-G (Mass. Sup. 
Ct. ªled Jan. 27, 2005). The original complaint was amended due to January 2005 news 
reports that Boston Mayor Thomas Menino and Boston University failed to disclose three 
BU scientists’ laboratory-acquired tularemia infections until after state environmental 
planning was approved. See, e.g., Stephen Smith, Bacterium Infected 3 at BU Biolab, Boston 
Globe, Jan. 19, 2005, at A1; Stephen Smith, BU Delayed Reporting Possibly Lethal Exposure, 
Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1. 
21 For a list of these proposed laboratory sites, see infra note 42. 
22 One of the foremost authorities on environmental litigation describes PEISs—also 
known as “program,” “cumulative,” and “comprehensive” EIS’s—as follows: 
 Cases arise in which an impact statement on a group of related actions or 
an agency program that may lead to later individual actions, may be helpful. 
The impact statement that is prepared in situations of this kind is known as a 
program environmental impact statement (PEIS). . . . Often it is difªcult to 
examine the cumulative impact of a number of individual but related actions 
when they are reviewed one at a time. The [PEIS] can help overcome this 
problem by considering a group of related actions together or by reviewing 
the implications of an agency’s program comprehensively before it produces 
actions that will be reviewed individually. 
Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 9:2 (Supp. 2005). 
23 See December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 2. 
24 See, e.g., Patrick E. Barney, The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 16 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 14 (1981) (“Federal 
agencies often function in incremental steps with no overall plan. . . . The predictable 
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ties as to how and when to complete PEISs have recently led one gov-
ernment task force to call for their modernization, as some agencies 
“struggle[d]” with this “valuable decisionmaking tool[].”25
 This Note supports the need for PEIS modernization; the predic-
tions made herein regarding the impending Project BioShield litiga-
tion also bolster the need for this Note’s proffered remedies. Part I 
details the recent political events leading up to the present contro-
versy. Part II establishes the foundation for the plaintiffs’ “Failure to 
Complete a PEIS” claim by discussing the statutory and regulatory 
foundation behind PEISs, as well as related case law from the past 
three decades. Part III examines two relevant branches of plaintiffs’ 
“Inadequate EIS” claim: failure to adequately consider project alter-
natives, and inadequate risk-assessment methodologies. 
 In an effort to catalog probable litigation outcomes, Parts IV and 
V analyze the backgrounds from Parts II and III, respectively, as they 
apply to Project BioShield litigation. While Part IV concludes that a 
court reviewing the siting of any of the proposed laboratories is not 
likely at this point to mandate a PEIS for Project BioShield, Part V ex-
amines the potential Boston litigation speciªcally and concludes that 
a reviewing court may indeed invalidate the BUMC EIS, either for in-
adequate consideration of project alternatives or inadequate risk-
assessment methodologies. 
 Part VI applies the litigation predictions from Parts IV and V to a 
well-known game theory model entitled the prisoner’s dilemma. This 
model demonstrates that the optimal outcome would have required 
agency completion of a thorough PEIS at Project BioShield’s inception. 
Since the panacea of agency-environmentalist cooperation is shown to 
be realistically unattainable, this Part concludes that Congress, the ex-
ecutive appointee in charge of promulgating environmental regula-
tions, and the courts should nonetheless strive for the best possible out-
come by attempting to force concessions from both sides. 
 Finally, Part VII offers recommendations to all three branches of 
government on how to modernize PEISs. Although signiªcant im-
                                                                                                                      
result is agency resistance to broad [PEIS] . . . requirements.”); Jon C. Cooper, Broad Pro-
grammatic, Policy and Planning Assessments Under the National Environmental Policy Act and 
Similar Devices: A Quiet Revolution in an Approach to Environmental Considerations, 11 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 89, 116–17 (1993) (recognizing the “substantial debate over the proper 
role for [PEISs] in the work of the federal government.”). 
25 See NEPA Task Force, Report to the Council on Environmental Quality: 
Modernizing NEPA Implementation 35 (2003), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/ 
report/ªnalreport.pdf. 
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provement from any individual branch would require overcoming the 
powerful inertia of the status quo, clarifying regulations from the ex-
ecutive branch would have the most welcome effect on agencies’ PEIS 
interpretations. This Part argues that such interpretive regulations are 
unlikely to be forthcoming in the absence of sincere judicial censure of 
agencies’ current EIS shortcomings and PEIS reticence. As the pris-
oner’s dilemma analysis demonstrates, Project BioShield litigation pre-
sents the judiciary with just such an opportunity. 
I. Setting the Stage for Litigation 
 In order to prepare the United States for a potential bioterrorism 
attack, President George W. Bush has authorized a major funding ini-
tiative intended to increase the amount of research space dedicated to 
the study of potential bioterrorism agents.26 Due to the inherently dan-
gerous nature of the bioterrorism agents, local siting disputes have 
arisen at several of the newly proposed laboratories.27
A. Project BioShield and the Push for More BSL-3/4 Space 
 President Bush ªrst mentioned Project BioShield during his 
January 2003 State of the Union Address.28 Shortly thereafter, details 
of the plan revealed that Project BioShield would consist of $6 billion 
in funding, a large part of which would be allocated for “research and 
development on bioterrorism threat agents.”29 Eighteen months later 
President Bush signed into law the Project BioShield Act,30 stating, 
“Our goal is to translate today’s promising medical research into drugs 
and vaccines to combat a biological attack in the future—and now we 
will not let bureaucratic obstacles stand in the way.”31
 As a result of the President’s initiative, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) has seen its prominence—and its funding—increase 
                                                                                                                      
26 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
27 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
28 2003 State of the Union Address, supra note 6, at 113. 
29 Press Release, Ofªce of the Press Sec’y, White House, President Details Project 
BioShield (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/ 
20030203.html. 
30 Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codiªed in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.). 
31 Press Release, Ofªce of the Press Secretary, White House, President Bush Signs Pro-
ject Bioshield [sic] Act of 2004 ( July 21, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html. 
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dramatically in the past four years.32 From an annual budget of almost 
$50 million for “anti-bioterrorism research” in ªscal year 2001,33 NIH 
has seen its coffers balloon to nearly $1.7 billion in estimated ªscal year 
2005 funding for “biodefense research”—an increase of 3,400%.34
 Regardless of which public relations moniker is used, the research 
in question has traditionally been conducted by a speciªc branch of 
NIH: the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID).35 Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and 
the October 2001 anthrax attacks that killed ªve people, NIAID con-
vened a blue ribbon panel on “Bioterrorism and Its Implications for 
Biomedical Research,” which concluded that “[a]ccess to [BSL-3/4] 
facilities . . . is limited and must be expanded.”36 Although this view-
point has been disputed by some,37 the passage of the Project BioShield 
Act makes it clear that both the executive and legislative branches be-
lieve that there is an imminent public health threat that the swift pro-
liferation of BSL-3/4 laboratories can help allay. 
B. NIAID Responds, Amid Controversy 
 To this end, NIAID undertook two laboratory expansion initia-
tives with its new-found capital. First, it sought to enhance and up-
grade the existing BSL-3/4 space as much as possible at its intramural 
                                                                                                                      
32 See H. Clifford Lane et al., Bioterrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, 7 Nature Med. 
1271, 1271 (2001). 
33 Id. at 1272. 
34 See Rona Hirschberg et al., Biomedical Research—An Integral Component of National Se-
curity, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 2119, 2120 (2004). 
35 See Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, NIAID’s Role in Biodefense, http://www2. 
niaid.nih.gov/Biodefense/About/niaids_role.htm (last visited May 5, 2006) (“[NIAID], part 
of the National Institutes of Health, conducts and supports much of the research aimed at 
developing new and improved medical tools against potential bioterrorism agents.”). 
36 Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. NIAID Biodefense Research Agenda for CDC Category A Agents 4 (2002), 
available at http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/Biodefense/Research/biotresearchagenda.pdf; see 
also William J. Broad, I Beg to Differ, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2004, at F3 (“Dr. Richard O. 
Spertzel, a microbiologist who led the United Nations inspections for germ weapons in 
Iraq, defended the new laboratories as critical to national security . . . . ‘They’re absolutely 
required . . . . Speed is of the essence. We’re way behind in protecting ourselves.’”); Judith 
Miller, New Biolabs Stir a Debate over Secrecy and Safety, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2004, at F1. 
37 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 36 (“Dr. Richard H. Ebright, a professor of Chemistry at 
Rutgers, who is a lab director at its Waksman Institute of Microbiology . . . called much of 
the Level 4 construction overkill, as well as a misdirection of scarce resources.”); Merrill 
Goozner, Bioterror Brain Drain, Am. Prospect, Oct. 1, 2003, at 32 (“‘It’s distracting from 
global health . . . . We’ll learn some things [from bioterrorism research] that are relevant, 
but not much.’” (quoting Dr. Carol Nacy, founder of the Sequella Global Tuberculosis 
Foundation) (alteration in original)). 
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laboratories—sites already under federal control.38 Believing that these 
improvements would not result in a large enough increase in labora-
tory capacity, NIAID also attempted to locate willing extramural insti-
tutional partners by issuing a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) in 
late 2002.39 This document stated that any “Domestic (U.S.), Non-
Federal, Public or Private Non-Proªt Organizations that Support Bio-
medical Research [were] eligible to apply” for funding to run “Re-
gional Biocontainment Laboratories (RBL[s]) and National Biocon-
tainment Laboratories (NBL[s]).”40 Institutions selected to receive 
RBLs would build BSL-2 and BSL-3 space with one-time federal con-
struction grants ranging from $7 to $21 million each, while institutions 
awarded NBLs would be required to build BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4 
space with grants of $120 million each.41
 On September 30, 2003, in what former Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Tommy G. Thompson hailed as “‘a major step towards 
being able to provide Americans with effective therapies, vaccines and 
diagnostics for diseases caused by agents of bioterror,’” NIAID awarded 
nine RBLs and two NBLs to selected universities across the nation.42
 Not everyone shares the former Secretary’s exuberance for the 
proposed BSL-3/4 laboratories, however. For a variety of reasons,43 
protests have sprung up in a number of communities where laborato-
ries—both intramural and extramural—have been proposed.44 In an 
                                                                                                                      
38 See The NIH Biodefense Research Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and 
Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (state-
ment of Anthony S. Fauci, Director, NIAID), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/ 
t050208.html. 
39 See generally Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Request for Proposals and 
Applications: BAA-NIH-NIAID-NCRR-DMID-03–36 (Oct. 15, 2002) http://www.niaid.nih. 
gov/contract/archive/RFP0336–0.pdf [hereinafter NIAID RFP]. 
40 Id. at 1. 
41 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 7. Interestingly, each institution also 
would be contractually bound to be “utilized for biomedical research purposes as deter-
mined by NIAID program needs for at least 20 years.” NIAID RFP, supra note 39, at 7. 
42 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 7 (quoting Tommy G. Thompson, 
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.). RBLs were awarded to Colorado State University, 
Duke University, Tulane University, the University of Alabama at Birmingham, the Univer-
sity of Chicago, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, the University of 
Missouri, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Tennessee. Id. NBLs were 
awarded to the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and the Boston University 
Medical Center. Id. 
43 See discussion infra Parts II, III; see also infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
44 See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, Citizens Sue to Block Montana Biodefense Lab, 305 Sci. 1088, 
1088 (2004) (“Montanans have gone to federal court . . . to block construction of [an 
NIH] biodefense laboratory . . . .”); Andrew Lawler, Boston Weighs a Ban on Biodefense Stud-
ies, 304 Sci. 665, 665 (2004); Louise Richardson, Buying Biosafety—Is the Price Right?, 350 
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effort to predict the outcomes of potential lawsuits,45 the following 
Parts discuss several of the major claims likely to be made by envi-
ronmental plaintiffs.46
II. Litigation Background: “Failure to Complete a PEIS” Claim 
 A December 2004 letter from two environmental groups, detailing 
the shortcomings of NIH’s draft environmental review for the proposed 
BUMC NBL, articulates the environmental plaintiffs’ ªrst major claim: 
NIH’s failure to complete a PEIS before proceeding with the site-
speciªc EIS process.47 This topic is relevant to Project BioShield as a 
whole because initial completion of a PEIS would have rendered this 
claim moot nationwide. 
 Although the broad language of the nation’s most important envi-
ronmental law does not speciªcally mention PEISs,48 the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ)—established to aid in the statute’s in-
terpretation—has recognized the existence of PEISs and has issued 
regulations deªning their relevance.49 The courts, in turn, have vali-
dated CEQ’s view that PEISs are legitimate undertakings, and have 
even stated that, under certain circumstances, PEISs are required.50 
Although courts often defer to federal agencies’ determinations re-
garding whether to prepare a PEIS, a line of cases indicates that re-
search into nominally beneªcial but potentially damaging new tech-
nology should require a PEIS.51
A. Statutory Authority: The National Environmental Policy Act’s 
 “Broad Brush” 
 Upon its inception in 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) was considered “the most important and far-reaching envi-
ronmental and conservation measure ever enacted by the Congress.”52 
                                                                                                                      
New Eng. J. Med. 2121, 2121 (2004) (“The University of Texas . . . has . . . faced public 
concern about building the [BSL-3/4] facility in an area that is prone to hurricanes . . . .”); 
Miller, supra note 36. 
45 See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
46 See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
47 See December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 2; see also supra note 23 and accompany-
ing text. 
48 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
49 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
50 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409–10 (1976). 
51 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
52 115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (Dec. 20, 1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson). 
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At that time, the legislative talk of a “comprehensive national [envi-
ronmental] policy”53 was in part a reference to the scope of review that 
government agencies were henceforth required to conduct upon the 
proposal of any “major Federal actions signiªcantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.”54 This broad review—known as an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS)—is a “detailed” report on, inter alia, 
“the environmental impact of the proposed action.”55
 Although an EIS must be detailed, the language of NEPA itself re-
mains purposefully vague, reºecting the legislators’ intent to replace 
what had been a piecemeal approach among the agencies towards en-
vironmental planning with a more “rationalized, comprehensive sys-
tem.”56 NEPA’s broad language does not speciªcally mention PEISs, 
leaving the interpretation of its provisions to the appropriate regulatory 
authority.57 Importantly, the federal government is directed to “use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of na-
tional policy” in exercising their discretion with respect to environ-
mental decisions.58
B. Regulatory Authority: CEQ’s PEIS Recommendations 
 CEQ was created by NEPA in 1969 and was charged with review-
ing, investigating, and reporting back to the President on environ-
mental issues.59 Due to early confusion over how much weight agen-
cies were required to give CEQ’s guidelines, President Carter issued 
an Executive Order in 1977 empowering CEQ to interpret NEPA’s 
procedural provisions and issue its ªndings as regulations.60 These 
regulations became binding upon all federal agencies in November 
                                                                                                                      
53 S. Rep. No. 91-296, at 5 (1969). 
54 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). 
55 Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i). 
56 Richard A. Johnston, Kleppe v. Sierra Club: An Environmental Catch-22?, 1 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 182, 219 (1976). 
57 Matthew C. Porterªeld, Agency Action, Finality and Geographical Nexus: Judicial Review 
of Agency Compliance with NEPA’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Requirement 
After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 619, 625 (1994). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). 
59 See id. §§ 4342, 4344. 
60 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977); see Jennifer R. Bartlit, 
Comment, An Adequate EIS Under NEPA: Deference to CEQ; Merely Conceptual Listing of Mitiga-
tion Leads Us to a Merely Conceptual National Environmental Policy, 31 Nat. Resources J. 653, 
659 (1991). 
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1979, and have been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to be en-
titled to “substantial deference.”61
 The CEQ regulations make numerous positive references to the 
overarching policy theory behind PEISs: if disparate federal actions 
are sufªciently related, a broad PEIS should be conducted if it will 
serve to “avoid duplication and delay” in the longrun.62 Echoing 
NEPA’s statutory language, the regulations list “systematic and con-
nected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a 
speciªc statutory program or executive directive” as a recognized 
“Federal action[].”63 Once this threshold has been met, the regula-
tions further state that an EIS “may be prepared, and [is] sometimes 
required” for the project as a whole64—the very deªnition of a PEIS. 
 When preparing statements on these expansive actions, agencies 
are encouraged to consider preparing a PEIS for proposals which 
have “common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementa-
tion, media, or subject matter.”65 Similarly, and perhaps more relevant 
to Project BioShield, a PEIS on federal proposals that are at the same 
“stage of technological development including federal or federally 
assisted research . . . for new technologies” may be required “before 
the program has reached a stage of investment or commitment to im-
plementation likely to determine subsequent development or restrict 
later alternatives.”66
 Lastly, CEQ regulations devote a subsection to the deªnition of 
“tiering”: the discretionary process by which an agency may choose to 
ªle a PEIS discussing broad program objectives before following up 
with site-speciªc EISs referencing the general ªndings.67
C. Case Law 
 NEPA is aptly described as a statute more concerned with looking 
at the forest than the trees. In spite of—or perhaps because of—its 
broad language and purpose, NEPA’s legislative history has often 
                                                                                                                      
61 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2004); 
Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,263 ( July 28, 1983). 
62 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(d), 1508.25(a)(3); see also id. § 1502.4(a) (“Proposals or parts 
of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course 
of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement.”). 
63 Id. § 1508.18(b)(3) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). 
64 Id. § 1502.4(b). 
65 See id. § 1502.4(c)(2). 
66 See id. § 1502.4(c)(3). Whether this phrase is a requirement is subject to debate. See 
discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
67 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 
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played a secondary role to case law in court decisions.68 At the highest 
level, the U.S. Supreme Court has been disappointingly silent on the 
applicability of PEISs, issuing its lone deªning opinion on the matter— 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club—three decades ago.69 Following the Supreme 
Court’s lead,70 lower courts have generally refused to take a serious 
look at the PEIS issue in the context of NEPA’s legislative history, lead-
ing one observer to note that “it is difªcult to successfully challenge an 
agency’s decision to forego a programmatic assessment.”71 In one line 
of cases, however, a circuit court has held that PEISs are indeed re-
quired for certain national research programs.72
1. Kleppe v. Sierra Club 
 One year before its precedential Kleppe decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Aberdeen & Rockªsh Railroad Co. v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).73 In SCRAP, the Court paved the 
way for Kleppe by acknowledging the existence of different types of EISs 
corresponding in breadth to the type of proposed federal action.74 A 
regional or national federal action would therefore warrant an EIS of 
correspondingly regional or national scope: a PEIS.75
 Subsequently, the Court’s decision in Kleppe speciªcally stated 
that PEISs of a national scope were indeed legitimate undertakings.76 
Citing SCRAP, the Court observed that, although these PEISs would 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural Environment: 
Some Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 
Envtl. L. 611, 614 n.11 (1990) (declaring—16 years ago—that, “[a]fter 20 years and a 
recent tendency for courts to drift further away from the purposes Congress intended to 
serve, it may be time again to examine NEPA’s parentage”). 
69 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
70 See, e.g., Porterªeld, supra note 57, at 666 n.247 (“While still on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Scalia complained in a law 
review article about ‘the judiciary’s long love affair with environmental litigation.’” (quot-
ing Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 884 (1983))); David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to 
NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12–0 Record, 20 Envtl. L. 551, 553 (1990) (stating 
that, in NEPA’s ªrst 21 years of existence, “[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] never decided a 
case, or for that matter a single issue in a case, in favor of a NEPA plaintiff”). 
71 See Cooper, supra note 24, at 98. 
72 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
73 422 U.S. 289 (1975). 
74 See id. at 322. 
75 See id. 
76 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 398–415 (1976). The Court refers to PEISs as 
“comprehensive impact statements.” Id. at 409. 
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likely “bear little resemblance” to site-speciªc local EISs,77 they would 
be valid in either case since the “bounds of the analysis are deªned.”78 
Moreover, the Kleppe Court ruled that NEPA’s “action forcing” EIS ob-
ligation “may require a [PEIS] in certain situations where several pro-
posed actions are pending at the same time.”79 In the words of Justice 
Powell, “[W]hen several proposals for . . . actions that will have cumu-
lative or synergistic environmental impact . . . are pending concur-
rently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be 
considered together.”80 The Court cited the statute’s lofty policy ob-
jectives in determining Congress’s original intention to require “‘all 
agencies to assure consideration of the environmental impact of their 
actions in decisionmaking.’”81
2. Reconciling Kleppe with a Deferential Standard of Review 
 Though Kleppe is still good law after thirty years, the Court’s ªnd-
ing that a PEIS is required in certain circumstances has proven 
difªcult to implement in lower courts.82 This is due in large part to 
the deferential “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review for agency 
actions.83 Indeed, in Kleppe itself, the Court stated that, for a plaintiff 
to prevail on a charge of failure to complete a PEIS, she “must show 
that [an agency has] acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one com-
prehensive statement on [an] entire region . . . .”84
 One year after Kleppe, a ruling of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia heralded the lower courts’ frequent response to 
PEIS challenges.85 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Adams addressed a 
major revision of the National Airport System Plan that sought to up-
grade public airports across the nation.86 Citing Kleppe, the district 
court found that the plan was indeed a “proposal for a major federal 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 402 n.14. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 409 n.18 (discussing the Senate’s use of the phrase “action forcing” in refer-
ence to certain NEPA sections). 
80 Id. at 410 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. (citation omitted). 
82 See Cooper, supra note 24, at 98 (“The Supreme Court . . . has set a high threshold 
before requiring the preparation of a [PEIS]. . . . Thus, it is difªcult to successfully chal-
lenge an agency’s decision to forego a [PEIS] . . . .”). 
83 See generally Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989); Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
84 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412. 
85 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977). 
86 Id. at 404. 
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action” with a national scope, and therefore required preparation of a 
PEIS.87 After stating its adherence to the Supreme Court’s ruling, how-
ever, the lower court refused to impose its stated “requirement.”88 Cit-
ing the fact that the agency had previously decided to prepare site-
speciªc EISs, the court held that “there would be little sense in requir-
ing an impact statement at the planning stage which would cover the 
same ground.”89 Thus, despite ruling that a PEIS was required under 
Kleppe, the court deferred to the agency’s decision not to prepare 
one.90
 In Churchill County v. Norton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reafªrmed the Adams holding nearly a quarter-century later.91 In hold-
ing that there is little courts can do if agencies do not act arbitrarily— 
even when a court ªnds a PEIS to be the preferred method of analy-
sis—the Ninth Circuit stated: 
The regulations and case law would support a decision by the 
[defendant agency] to prepare a programmatic EIS, had it 
decided to prepare one. Indeed, had we been charged with 
the decision, we may have elected to prepare a programmatic 
EIS ªrst. The problem, of course, is that it was not our deci-
sion to make.92
 Finally, although it is often the function of courts to substantively 
balance and choose between polarized positions, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted NEPA as a strictly procedural statute since the 1980s.93 
Thus, regardless of the conºicting policy arguments often present in 
environmental litigation,94 courts leave the NEPA-mandated balanc-
ing of interests up to the expertise of agencies.95
                                                                                                                      
87 See id. at 406–07 (discussing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000)). Although the court stated that an EIS was necessary here, its 
reference to subsequent, site-speciªc EISs indicates that it was conceptually describing a 
PEIS. See id. at 408. 
88 See id. at 407–08. 
89 Id. at 408. 
90 See id. 
91 See 276 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2001). 
92 Id. at 1079. 
93 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
94 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 983 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(“[B]oth parties assert important public policy concerns—environmental preservation by 
[plaintiffs] and national security by [the agency].”). 
95 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2000); see 
Churchill County, 276 F.3d at 1079. 
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3. New Technologies 
 One line of cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals discusses 
the implications of using PEISs for research into new technologies.96 
These cases show that, despite courts’ deference to agencies’ decisions, 
research into a nominally beneªcial but potentially damaging new 
technology should require a PEIS. 
 Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com-
mission (SIPI ) was decided before Kleppe in 1973.97 In an opinion by 
Judge Skelly Wright, a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit held that 
NEPA required a PEIS for concerted federal technology research and 
development initiatives.98 In a time of “growing demand for economi-
cal clean energy,” the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had the 
support of both Congress and President Nixon in carrying out its 
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Program Plan.99 Despite 
this support and the public service potential of the research, the court 
ruled for the plaintiffs and stated that “[the AEC] takes an unneces-
sarily crabbed approach to NEPA in assuming that the impact state-
ment process was designed only for particular facilities rather than for 
analysis of the overall effects of broad agency programs. Indeed, quite 
the contrary is true.”100 Both the testimony of the AEC Chairman at a 
Senate Joint Hearing101 and a CEQ memorandum102 helped convince 
the court that it would “tread ªrm ground in holding that NEPA re-
quires [PEISs] for major federal research programs . . . .”103
 One year after Kleppe, the D.C. Circuit again addressed the issue 
of PEISs in the context of technology development programs.104 In 
                                                                                                                      
96 See generally Mandelker, supra note 22, § 9:7. 
97 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For a catalog of pre-SIPI, pro-PEIS cases, see Recent 
Case 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1050, 1053 n.19 (1974). 
98 See SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1091. 
99 See id. at 1083–84 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-325, at 25 (1971); 117 Cong. Rec. 
18,200–01 (1971) (statement of President Nixon)). 
100 See id. at 1086–87. 
101 Joint Hearings on Operation of National Environmental Policy Act Before Senate Committee 
on Public Works and Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 98–99 (1972) 
(statement of Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Chairman, AEC) (“[T]he public has a right to 
know . . . what the broader future implications may be of the cumulative impact of a num-
ber of such facilities, rather than looking at each facility microscopically.”). 
102 See Memorandum from CEQ to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving En-
vironmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972), reprinted in 3 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 82, 87 
(1972) (“In many cases, broad program statements will be appropriate, assessing . . . the 
environmental implications of research activities that have reached a stage of investment 
or commitment to implementation likely to restrict later alternatives.”). 
103 See SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1091. 
104 Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, citizens’ groups brought an action 
against the Secretary of Defense for his decision to locate a support 
facility for the new Trident nuclear submarine program in Bangor, 
Washington.105 The court distinguished its prior ruling in SIPI and 
found that no PEIS was necessary because unlike the LMFBR pro-
gram, the Trident program did not involve “brand new technology 
with the possibility of unforeseen or unknown consequences.”106 The 
court also stated that the Trident program did not come about as the 
result of any declared change to the national defense strategy.107 Im-
plicit in these rulings is an idea central to the current Project 
BioShield disputes: the government’s development of a new technol-
ogy with unknown environmental consequences—if commenced in 
response to an asserted change in national defense strategy—would 
not fall under the SIPI exception carved out by Trident.108
 Twelve years after authoring the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in SIPI, 
Judge Wright updated the court’s views on whether a PEIS should be 
completed for a federal technology research program. In Foundation 
on Economic Trends v. Heckler,109 he wrote that the challenge is “to en-
sure that the bold words and vigorous spirit of NEPA are not . . . lost 
or misdirected in the brisk frontiers of science.”110 The current de-
bates over Project BioShield’s proposed BSL-3/4 expansions echo the 
arguments in Heckler twenty years earlier.111 There, as in the instant 
dispute, plaintiffs challenged an NIH decision not to produce a PEIS 
for an action taken in the name of public health: the planned release 
of a genetically engineered bacteria into the environment.112 The 
court stated that the potential for environmental damage was a “‘low 
probability, high consequence risk; that is, while there is only a small 
possibility that damage could occur, the damage that could occur is 
great.’”113
                                                                                                                      
105 See id. at 820–21. 
106 See id. at 826. The Trident program was a development of the already-existing Po-
laris/Poseidon nuclear submarine program. Id. at 820 n.4. 
107 Id. at 826. 
108 See id. 
109 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
110 Id. at 145. 
111 See id. at 147. 
112 See id. at 150 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 24,549 ( June 1, 1983)). 
113 See id. at 147–48 (quoting Staff of Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight, 
House Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 98th Cong., Report on the Environmental Implica-
tions of Genetic Engineering 9 (Comm. Print 1984)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 Although the court ultimately deferred to the agency’s decision, 
it made a point of imposing a tangible obligation upon NIH.114 Citing 
SIPI, the court concluded that a failure to “at least consider” the ad-
visability of a PEIS would likely “violate established principles of rea-
soned decisionmaking.”115
 A concurring opinion by Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon reiter-
ated the D.C. Circuit’s collective viewpoint that a PEIS was highly rec-
ommended prior to implementation of a broad research agenda for a 
new technology, “not only [to] ease lay concerns, but [to] facilitate 
review as well.”116 Although Judge MacKinnon ultimately agreed with 
the majority that no PEIS was required in this speciªc case, the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s reluctance to stay within the bounds of the Supreme 
Court’s Kleppe ruling is evident.117
4. Do Not Waste Agency Resources 
 The circuit court’s ruling in Heckler is an example of a larger ten-
dency: courts will not require a PEIS if the agency has decided to 
complete site-speciªc EISs instead.118 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Adams provides an early expression of this sentiment, where a dis-
trict court stated that, “[s]ince, at the award stage, the Secretary has a 
speciªc application before him, . . . there would be little sense in re-
quiring an impact statement at the planning stage which would cover 
the same ground.”119 Both Heckler and Adams articulate the view, also 
held by CEQ in its regulations, that agencies should only apply PEIS 
methods if they can do so while “avoid[ing] duplication and delay.”120
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. at 160. 
115 See Heckler, 756 F.2d at 160 (“‘[An] agency may not ‘entirely fail[] to consider an 
important aspect of the problem.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (second alteration in original)). 
116 Id. at 161 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon stated: 
 I can understand how the . . . scientists who are knowledgeable in this ªeld 
. . . would approve the experiment by a vote of 19–0 with no abstentions. . . . 
However, the general public and those who have to pass on this action are not 
knowledgeable in this ªeld and they are easily frightened by new scientiªc 
experiments and their possible consequences. It is such lay concerns that 
must here be satisªed by [EISs]. There is considerable merit, moreover, in 
having all the environmental considerations set forth and discussed in one 
document . . . . 
Id. 
117 See id. 
118 See 756 F.2d at 159. 
119 434 F. Supp. 403, 408 (D.D.C. 1977). 
120 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(d) (2004). 
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 Mooreforce, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation—a recent 
district court case refusing to mandate a PEIS—illustrates the court’s 
reluctance to require a PEIS when it may waste resources.121 In denying 
the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to stop construction 
of a highway bypass, the Mooreforce court ruled that the plaintiffs were 
unlikely to prove that a PEIS was necessary.122 The court noted that the 
agency “could not accomplish the purpose of a PEIS because [it] had 
already completed an [EIS].”123 Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation 
v. Appalachian Regional Commission, a circuit court held that “relevance at 
the planning stage is the measure of agency reasonableness for preparing 
EISs.”124 In refusing to require a PEIS for construction of a highway 
system “well beyond the nascent stage,”125 the court noted a good-faith 
requirement for an agency’s postponement of its PEIS.126
III. Litigation Background: “Inadequate EIS” Claim 
 The second major NEPA claim in environmental groups’ com-
ment letters on Project BioShield is that NIH’s site-speciªc EIS, as com-
pleted, is inadequate.127 Because EISs are complex documents with 
various mandated components, a claim of this nature can fault a num-
ber of distinct aspects of an EIS.128 The two aspects of PEIS inadequacy 
most relevant to this Note’s discussion are: (1) failure to adequately 
consider alternative locations; and (2) inadequate risk-assessment 
methodologies. 
A. Failure to Adequately Consider Project Alternatives 
 In what the CEQ regulations characterize as the “heart” of an 
EIS,129 NEPA requires all federal agencies to consider possible alter-
natives to their proposed actions in an EIS.130 These alternatives may 
                                                                                                                      
121 See 243 F. Supp. 2d 425, 442–43 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 677 F.2d 883, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350–
51 (1979)). 
125 Id. at 885. 
126 Id. at 889 n.35 (“Of course an agency may not so delay the preparation of a [PEIS] 
that the document could no longer have any useful decisionmaking function. This would 
be an unreasonable, hence unlawful, evasion of NEPA.”). 
127 See December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 5–11. 
128 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (2000). 
129 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2004). 
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii), (2)(E). Though these NEPA subsections have 
slightly different approaches—subsection (2)(C)(iii) contains broader language than sub-
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take two different forms—referred to as primary and secondary al-
ternatives—between which courts do not discriminate when evaluat-
ing the adequacy of an EIS.131 NEPA requires agencies to consider 
these project alternatives in order to “insure the integrated use of . . . 
the environmental design arts in planning and decisionmaking.”132
 A CEQ regulation codiªes the “rule of reason” set forth in a lead-
ing circuit court decision,133 stating that agencies are to “[r]igorously 
explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for al-
ternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, brieºy discuss 
the reasons for their having been eliminated.”134 In addition, agencies 
must “[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in 
detail including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate 
their comparative merits.”135
 Importantly, agencies must state an underlying “purpose and 
need” to which they are responding when discussing proposed alter-
natives.136 The narrowness of these stated rationales can potentially 
limit the alternatives that an agency is required to take into ac-
count.137 Agencies have been criticized for intentionally propounding 
narrow project purposes,138 and two Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
                                                                                                                      
section (2)(E)—courts regularly see these two subsections as interchangeable. See Man-
delker, supra note 22, § 9:18. 
131 See generally Mandelker, supra note 22, §§ 10:31, 10:32. A primary alternative is “a 
substitute for the agency’s proposed action that accomplishes the action in another man-
ner,” while a secondary alternative is “a means of carrying out a proposed action in a dif-
ferent manner.” Id. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A). These alternatives must be analyzed and considered before 
agency decisions are made. The Second Circuit recognized as much shortly after NEPA’s 
inception, stating, “[T]he critical agency decision must, of course, be made after the [EIS] 
has been . . . considered and discussed in the light of the alternatives, not before. Other-
wise the process becomes a useless ritual, defeating the purpose of NEPA, and rather mak-
ing a mockery of it.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
133 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
134 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2004) (emphasis added). This regulation effectively estab-
lishes two categories for proposed alternatives—reasonable and unreasonable—for which 
the requisite levels of discussion are “detailed” and “brief,” respectively. See id. 
135 Id. § 1502.14(b). 
136 Id. § 1502.13. 
137 See Owen L. Schmidt, Essay, The Statement of Underlying Need Deªnes the Range of Alter-
natives in Environmental Documents, 18 Envtl. L. 371, 374 (1988) (“When the underlying 
need is for both ºood control and power, only a dam will meet that need and the range of 
alternatives may become very narrow.”). 
138 See Jason J. Czarnezki, Comment, Deªning the Project Purpose Under NEPA: Promoting 
Consideration of Viable EIS Alternatives, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 599, 619 (2003). 
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recently supported this assertion.139 However, the arbitrary or capri-
cious standard of review applies to judicial review of an agency’s stated 
purpose.140 Thus, notwithstanding these circuit court decisions, the 
majority of courts have found agencies’ purpose and need statements 
to be reasonable.141
 If a reviewing court does not invalidate an EIS for having a pur-
pose and need statement that is too narrow, it must then decide 
whether the agency’s discussion of alternatives violates the “‘rule of 
reason’ which governs both ‘which alternatives the agency must dis-
cuss’ and ‘the extent to which it must discuss them.’”142 The speciªc 
number of alternatives considered—whether discussed in detail or 
only brieºy—is not determinative; rather, an agency is charged with 
evaluating a “reasonable” number of alternatives for the particular 
situation.143 While courts have found to be reasonable agencies’ 
choices to discuss varying numbers of alternatives,144 they have at 
times found unreasonable agencies’ choices to discuss only a single 
alternative.145
 Another factor that makes it less likely for courts to rule in favor of 
plaintiffs is that agencies are not required to select the most environ-
                                                                                                                      
139 See, e.g., Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1118–20 (10th Cir. 2002); Simmons v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1997) (“One obvious way for an agency 
to slip past the strictures of NEPA is to contrive a purpose so slender as to deªne compet-
ing ‘reasonable alternatives’ out of consideration (and even out of existence).”). 
140 See Schmidt, supra note 137, at 381; discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
141 For a comprehensive list of cases either reversing or upholding agencies’ purpose 
statements at the circuit and district court levels, see Mandelker, supra note 22, § 9:23 n.8. 
Courts are approximately three times as likely to support agencies than they are to reverse 
them. See id. 
142 Tongass Conservation Soc’y v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 228, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
143 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2004). It is assumed that the CEQ-mandated no-action 
alternative will also be discussed in an EIS; failure to do so would be a per se violation of 
the regulations. See Id. § 1502.14(d). 
144 See, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 
1994) (ªnding an agency’s decisions to discuss two action alternatives in detail and to 
brieºy discuss why six other alternatives were eliminated to be reasonable); Town of Nor-
folk v. EPA, 761 F. Supp. 867, 883–84 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d mem., 960 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 
1992) (unpublished table decision) (holding an agency’s decision to discuss in detail ten 
action alternatives, brieºy discuss the reasons why two other alternatives were eliminated, 
and summarily dismiss 290 additional alternatives to be reasonable). 
145 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1037–41 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (ªnding the discussion of alternatives unreasonable where the two action 
alternatives discussed in detail were essentially equivalent); Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. 
Supp. 1373, 1379–81 (D. Mass. 1984). But see Tongass, 924 F.2d at 1138–39 (ªnding reason-
able an agency’s decision to provide detailed discussion of only a single alternative). 
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mentally preferable option as their favored alternative.146 Thus, once 
reasonable alternatives receive procedural consideration, an agency is 
free to select whichever alternative it desires based on criteria of its 
choosing.147 A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision gives cer-
tain agencies additional leeway by holding that an agency primarily 
concerned with conserving and protecting the environment is subject 
to less stringent requirements when choosing a range of alternatives to 
consider.148
 Acting as a judicial counterbalance, however, is the fact that 
courts will invalidate an EIS if the agency has neglected to fully ana-
lyze all of the reasonable alternatives.149 This requires a court hearing 
a challenge to an EIS to review both the reasonableness of an agency’s 
choice to forego certain alternatives, and the reasonableness of the 
agency’s level of review for its chosen alternatives. The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal’s conclusion in a 1997 case emphasizes this point 
succinctly: 
 If NEPA mandates anything, it mandates this: a federal 
agency cannot ram through a project before ªrst weighing the 
pros and cons of the alternatives. In this case, the ofªcials of 
[the agency] executed an end-run around NEPA’s core re-
quirement. By focusing on [one range of alternatives], [the 
agency] never looked at an entire category of reasonable al-
ternatives and thereby ruined its environmental impact state-
ment.150
                                                                                                                      
146 See Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 198 
F.3d 960, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
147 Id. 
148 See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the Forest Service was not required to conduct in-depth analyses of certain 
alternatives given its inherent “conservation and preventative goals.”). 
149 See, e.g., Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1192 
(10th Cir. 2002) (invalidating an EIS for unreasonable elimination of one alternative 
based on inadequate data and outright failure to consider two additional alternatives); 
Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1997) (“As a matter 
of logic, however, [the alternative suggested by the plaintiffs] is not absurd—which it must 
be to justify [the agency]’s failure to examine the idea at all.”). 
150 Simmons, 120 F.3d at 670. 
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B. Inadequate Risk-Assessment Methodologies 
 Prior to 1986, CEQ regulations required agencies to conduct a 
worst-case analysis when completing an EIS.151 Then, in a move that 
had been forecast three years earlier,152 CEQ revoked the worst-case 
analysis requirement.153 The new regulations required only analysis of 
“reasonably foreseeable” events and a statement of any “incomplete or 
unavailable” relevant information.154 In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the change, holding that requiring analysis of only “reasona-
bly foreseeable” occurrences would focus public discussion on the is-
sues of greatest relevance.155
 This change, coupled with a deferential standard of review, estab-
lished a high bar for plaintiffs challenging agencies’ decisions on 
whether, and how, to analyze certain environmental impacts.156 A one-
sided battle over scientiªc methodologies often results, with plaintiffs 
charging agencies with cherry-picking scientiªc studies to match their 
desired outcomes, and courts in turn deferring to those studies.157
 It may still be possible, however, to invalidate an EIS for failure to 
consider low-probability, high-risk environmental consequences of an 
agency action.158 As deªned in the regulations, “‘reasonably foresee-
able’ includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if 
their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the 
                                                                                                                      
151 For discussion of the former requirements, see Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Rise and 
Fall of Worst Case Analysis, 18 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1, 41 (1992); Carla Mattix & Kathleen 
Becker, Recent Developments, Scientiªc Uncertainty Under the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 1125, 1130–35 (2002); see also Forty Most Asked Questions Concern-
ing CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 
(Mar. 23, 1981) (discussing when a worst-case scenario must be included in an EIS), avail-
able at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/40p3.htm. 
152 See Nicholas Yost, Don’t Gut the Worst Case Analysis, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,394, 10,395–96 (Dec. 1983). 
153 See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable In-
formation, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625–26 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codiªed at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 
(2004)). 
154 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). 
155 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354–57 (1989). The 
Court noted that NEPA itself does not require a worst-case analysis. Id. at 354–55. 
156 See Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 60 (noting the “benign nature of judicial review of 
a federal agency’s compliance” with the new regulation); discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
157 See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to in-
validate an EIS because the plaintiff “simply presents an expert opinion conºicting with 
the U.S. Air Force’s conclusion”); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 616–21 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that the post-1986 requirements are “less stringent,” and deferring to the agency’s 
choice of scientiªc methodologies as valid because it was not “irrational”); S. Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance v. Norton, 326 F. Supp. 2d 102, 113 (D.D.C. 2004). 
158 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). 
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impacts is supported by credible scientiªc evidence, is not based on 
pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.”159 This language 
has led some observers to point out that courts may still be required 
to review the credibility of scientiªc opinions, if only to check for pro-
cedural compliance.160
 Despite the deferential standard of review and CEQ’s revocation 
of the worst-case scenario requirement, courts do at times engage in 
this type of review.161 In a 1991 district court decision, the Depart-
ment of Energy was required to fully examine the risks of transporting 
nuclear material: 
 The Department’s decision is akin to saying that some 
things just cannot happen. Yet the Department cannot deny 
that such accidents are possible . . . . Further, although the 
Department discounts the possibility of human intervention— 
either through error or sabotage, the risks remain. It is par-
ticularly important that a government agency be completely 
forthright about the risks of a program involving radioactive 
materials, which inspire great fear among many members of 
the public.162
The court went on to note—perhaps sarcastically—that since the 
agency had already come up with a risk assessment methodology likely 
to show that its actions carried no risk, it had no reason to not apply 
its chosen method to each potential risk scenario.163
IV. Analysis: Courts Are Unlikely to Mandate a PEIS for 
Project BioShield 
 Potential environmental plaintiffs can look to both regulatory 
language and case law to support their assertion that a PEIS is neces-
sary for Project BioShield.164 However, the commonsense objective of 
not wasting government resources would counsel against requiring a 
                                                                                                                      
159 Id. 
160 See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 22, § 10:22; Valerie M. Fogleman, Worst Case Analy-
ses: A Continued Requirement Under the National Environmental Policy Act?, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 53, 94 (1987) (“The requirement for preparation of a worst-case analysis is gone but a 
similar analysis may be required by the courts in order to ensure that an agency has con-
sidered the full range of environmental concerns encompassed by NEPA.”). 
161 See Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp. 852, 869 (D.D.C. 1991). 
162 Id. at 869 (citations omitted). 
163 Id. 
164 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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PEIS, since site-speciªc EISs have already been undertaken.165 When 
called upon to balance the plaintiffs’ claims with the conservation of 
government resources, a court will likely ªnd that no PEIS is neces-
sary for Project BioShield.166
A. Plaintiffs’ Argument: A PEIS Is Necessary 
 As evidenced by the fact that NIH has already prepared a Draft 
EIS (DEIS) for the proposed BUMC BSL-3/4 laboratory,167 that the 
nine proposed Project BioShield facilities constitute “major Federal 
actions signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment” 
is not under debate.168 Courts will analyze regulatory language and 
case law to determine whether a PEIS is necessary. Here, both CEQ’s 
guidelines and cases discussing the development of new technologies 
stand for the proposition that NIH should indeed conduct a PEIS. 
1. Regulatory Language 
 Because NEPA does not directly mention PEISs reviewing courts 
will look to CEQ regulations for guidance, and will give “substantial 
deference” to CEQ’s opinions.169 Interestingly, whether the CEQ pro-
vision most relevant to Project BioShield actually requires a PEIS is 
debatable.170 Section 1502.4(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations 
begins with the statement, “When preparing statements on broad ac-
tions . . . agencies may ªnd it useful to evaluate the proposal(s) in one 
of the following ways . . . .”171 Although this would seem to make the 
following subsections optional, subsection (c)(3)—discussing PEISs 
                                                                                                                      
165 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
166 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
167 See generally BUMC DEIS, supra note 4. 
168 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). If NIH had not prepared a DEIS, courts would al-
most certainly have seen Project BioShield as a “group of concerted actions to implement 
a speciªc policy or plan,” or as “systematic and connected agency decisions allocating 
agency resources to implement a speciªc statutory program or executive directive,” thus 
requiring some form of EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) (2004). 
169 See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Porterªeld, supra note 57, at 
625. Importantly, the dispute here is not over whether CEQ’s PEIS regulations themselves 
are arbitrary or capricious—Andrus effectively answered that question in the negative. See 
Andrus, 442 U.S. at 358. Rather, environmental plaintiffs feel that NIH’s decision not to 
prepare a PEIS was arbitrary and capricious for neglecting to follow CEQ’s regulations. See 
December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c). 
171 Id. (emphasis added). 
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for new technologies—contains the statement that PEISs “shall be 
prepared on such programs.”172
 Environmental plaintiffs may make the argument that the word 
“shall” in subsection (c)(3) means that certain PEISs must be conducted 
for programs involving a certain “stage of technological development 
including federal or federally assisted research, development or dem-
onstration programs for new technologies.”173 Project BioShield ªts in 
this category. 
 Similarly, the deªnition of “tiering” in the regulations appears di-
rectly applicable to Project BioShield.174 This term refers to “the cover-
age of general matters in broader environmental impact statements 
(such as national program or policy statements) with subsequent nar-
rower statements . . . (such as . . . site-speciªc statements) incorporating 
by reference the general discussions.”175 Although agencies may use 
tiering at their discretion, a reviewing court may read the inclusion of 
tiering in the regulations as an indication that CEQ intended for agen-
cies to use it.176
2. New Technology Cases 
 From the U.S. Supreme Court’s Kleppe v. Sierra Club decision, it is 
clear that PEISs of a national scope are required in certain instances.177 
To determine whether Project BioShield falls within the ambit of the 
Court’s decision, further examination of the previously discussed line 
of cases involving new technologies is instructive.178 These cases suggest 
that reviewing courts may see Project BioShield as exactly the kind of 
“broad action” envisioned by CEQ when drafting its regulations.179
 Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com-
mission (SIPI ), has several remarkable similarities to the case at 
hand.180 SIPI involved the development of nuclear power technology; 
in that case, as with Project BioShield, a government agency had the 
support of both Congress and the President to begin a nationwide 
research initiative into a potentially beneªcial, but also potentially 
                                                                                                                      
172 See id. § 1502.4(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
173 See id. 
174 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
175 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 
176 See id. 
177 See 427 U.S. 390, 398–415 (1976); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
178 See discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
179 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
180 See 481 F.2d 1079, 1085–93 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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dangerous, new technology.181 Environmental citizens’ groups litigat-
ing the construction of BSL-3/4 laboratories would do well to quote 
Judge Skelly Wright’s ruling that a court would “tread ªrm ground in 
holding that NEPA requires [PEISs] for major federal research pro-
grams.”182
 Although the court did not ªnd a PEIS necessary in Concerned 
About Trident v. Rumsfeld, the circumstances surrounding that case are 
distinguishable from those of Project BioShield.183 The court in Trident 
stated that the submarine modernization at issue did not involve any 
new technology with “the possibility of unforeseen or unknown conse-
quences.”184 In contrast, however, it could be argued that there are 
many unknowable aspects of Project BioShield’s proposed widespread 
research into BSL-3/4 pathogens.185 Similarly, the Trident court de-
clined to require a PEIS because there was “no shift in our defense pol-
icy.”186 Rather, since the new Trident submarines were simply updated 
replacements for the outdated Polaris/Poseidon submarines, a PEIS 
was not required.187 Project BioShield, on the other hand, is clearly a 
major shift in the way the Bush administration intends to defend the 
country in the newly emerging “Time of Terror.”188
 If a plaintiff were to use these cases addressing new technology to 
bolster the argument that a PEIS should be ordered for Project 
BioShield, however, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler would have 
to be rationalized.189 In a case remarkably similar to the Project 
BioShield debate, the court noted that the agency had “‘passed the 
point at which a [PEIS] is required by NEPA and the [CEQ]’s regula-
tions,’” and ruled that a PEIS, though “helpful,” was not required.190 
                                                                                                                      
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 1091. 
183 See 555 F.2d 817, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
184 Id. 
185 Opponents of Project BioShield have discussed several variations on this theme. 
One virologist has argued that stockpiling viruses could be a threat to public health. See 
Brown, supra note 14 (quoting Robert Webster, St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, 
Memphis, Tenn.). Others have noted that the innocent quest for biodefense knowledge 
may lead researchers to create new, deadlier viruses. See Daniel Schulman & Adam Smith, 
When Bioterror Moves Next Door, Boston Globe Mag., Aug. 8, 2004, at 24, 30. 
186 Trident, 555 F.2d at 826. 
187 See id. 
188 For use of the phrase “Time of Terror” in reference to the world as it exists after 
September 11, 2001, see generally Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Ter-
ror (2003). 
189 See 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
190 See Heckler, 756 F.2d at 159 (quoting Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. 
Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984)) (emphasis omitted); supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
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With this language in mind, plaintiffs must argue that Project BioShield 
has not passed this point. Additionally, a plaintiff would want to argue 
that NIH never even considered completing a PEIS, as the court re-
quired in Heckler.191 Lastly, a plaintiff would want to quote the language 
of Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon’s concurrence, and assure the 
court that the lawsuit was not brought with “delaying tactics” in 
mind.192
B. Agency’s Argument: A PEIS Is Not Necessary 
 The deference that reviewing courts must give to agencies’ deci-
sions creates a signiªcant hurdle for plaintiffs to clear before their 
claim will be heard.193 Adding to the plaintiffs’ challenge is the fact that 
agencies have an entrenched policy argument they can use to counter 
plaintiffs’ claims that a PEIS is necessary for Project BioShield: gov-
ernment agencies should not waste resources by reevaluating informa-
tion that has already been analyzed.194
 Presumably in good faith, NIH made the decision to not prepare a 
PEIS for Project BioShield.195 Because of courts’ deferential standard of 
review toward agencies’ choices, NIH’s decision alone might be enough 
for a court to refuse mandating a PEIS.196 Tipping the scales even fur-
ther in favor of the agency is the fact that work has already begun on 
the EISs in question. NIH’s current position is similar to that of the 
Department of Transportation in Mooreforce, Inc. v. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, where site-speciªc EISs were complete at the time of liti-
gation.197 Similarly, two separate circuit court decisions have stated that 
a PEIS should only be prepared if it can be “forward-looking”—a qual-
ity that cannot exist when individual, site-speciªc EISs have already 
                                                                                                                      
191 See Heckler, 756 F.2d at 160. Although there does not seem to be any evidence that a 
PEIS was considered for Project BioShield, this is a difªcult argument to prove due to the 
inherent difªculties in proving a negative. Cf. Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 
1078–79 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that an agency that originally decided to prepare a PEIS 
but subsequently decided to only prepare an EIS was not arbitrary in making its “close 
call”). 
192 See Heckler, 756 F.2d at 161 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); supra notes 116–17 and ac-
companying text. 
193 See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
194 See discussion supra Part II.C.4. 
195 See generally BUMC DEIS, supra note 4. For a discussion of the “good faith” re-
quirements of EISs, see Aersten v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1980). 
196 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–
66 (1984); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403, 408 (D.D.C. 1977). 
197 See 243 F. Supp. 2d 425, 442–43 (M.D.N.C. 2003); see also supra note 123 and ac-
companying text. 
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been prepared.198 Consequently, NIH can effectively argue that it 
should not have to prepare a PEIS, since imposing that requirement 
would “not accomplish the purpose of a PEIS,” and would likely violate 
CEQ’s directive to “avoid duplication and delay.”199
C. Prediction 
 Because of the deference NIH will receive from the court, plain-
tiffs must fully meet their burden in order to persuade a judge to man-
date a PEIS. Although the CEQ regulations contain language that 
plaintiffs can cite with respect to new technologies and tiering, the 
regulations also support NIH’s assertion that a PEIS should not be 
completed because it would cause “duplication and delay.”200 Although 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has made a 
point of adhering to the exact regulatory language when interpreting 
new technology cases, it stands alone.201 Meanwhile, Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting NEPA have been conspicuously sparse, and those 
that exist have overwhelmingly upheld agency actions.202 Consequently, 
environmental plaintiffs are unlikely to convince a reviewing court to 
require NIH to prepare a PEIS for Project BioShield. 
V. Case Study Analysis: Courts May Invalidate the BUMC EIS 
 In analyzing the likelihood of plaintiffs’ claim that the site-speciªc 
EIS is inadequate as ªled, each of the two issues detailed in Part III 
must be examined. Because NIH declined to prepare a PEIS, however, 
it is not possible to herein address the speciªcs of each individual EIS. 
As such, this Note analyzes these charges as they speciªcally apply to 
                                                                                                                      
198 See Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001); Found. on 
Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also discussion supra Part 
II.C.4. 
199 Mooreforce, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 442; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(d) (2004). 
200 Furthermore, the regulatory landscape in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks is 
such that national security concerns are likely to trump public health concerns for the 
foreseeable future. See Barry Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, 13 
Health Matrix 159, 160 (2003). 
201 See Cooper, supra note 24, at 100 (“Over a number of years the Supreme Court had 
become increasingly impatient with what was perceived by some justices as excessive free-
wheeling decision-making by the D.C. Circuit.”); discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
202 See Mandelker, supra note 22, § 1:6; Shilton, supra note 70, at 553 (noting that the 
Supreme Court did not decide a single issue in favor of NEPA plaintiffs in the statute’s ªrst 
21 years). 
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the EIS submitted by NIH for the BUMC site.203 The conclusions drawn 
may apply to other Project BioShield lawsuits, depending on the ade-
quacy of the respective EISs. More important for the purposes of this 
Note, the potential inadequacy of the BUMC EIS raises signiªcant 
questions about the future role of PEISs in general.204
A. Consideration of Project Alternatives May Be Inadequate 
 A reviewing court could potentially invalidate the BUMC DEIS 
for any one of the following reasons: (1) an impermissibly narrow 
purpose and need statement; (2) failure to discuss in detail a reason-
able number of alternatives; (3) failure to discuss in detail a reason-
able alternative; and (4) disingenuous timing. 
 The BUMC DEIS’s purpose and need statement reads in pertinent 
part: “The purpose of the Proposed Action is to fund the construction 
of the Boston-NBL at the BioSquare Research Park . . . . [The facility] 
would be located on the BUMC campus in Boston, MA . . . .”205 Admit-
tedly a “slippery concept,” NIH’s deªnition of “purpose” in this in-
stance appears to be “so slender as to deªne competing reasonable al-
ternatives out of consideration (and even out of existence).”206 It is 
difªcult to imagine a single alternative which would ªt this purpose 
besides NIH’s own predetermined choice. As the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals recently noted, a reviewing court may conclude that “such a 
narrow deªnition of Project needs would violate NEPA.”207
 Secondly, the BUMC DEIS provides a detailed discussion of only a 
single action alternative in addition to the requisite no action alterna-
                                                                                                                      
203 This analysis is based upon BUMC’s October 2004 draft EIS (DEIS). See BUMC 
DEIS, supra note 4. In an effort to allay the DEIS’s recognized shortcomings, BUMC sub-
mitted a supplemental draft EIS (SDEIS) in March 2005. See generally Nat’l Insts. of 
Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Supplemental Draft Envtl. Impact 
Statement: National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, Boston (2005), 
available at http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/SDEIS.pdf. 
As noted by EPA, however, the SDEIS did not fully accomplish this ameliorative task. 
See Letter from Robert W. Varney, Region 1 Administrator, EPA, to Valerie Nottingham, 
Nat’l Insts. of Health 1–5 (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/ 
Biolabdocs/EPASDEIScomments.tif (stating that “the analysis of alternative locations should 
be expanded,” and that “the worst case quantitative risk assessment used many assump-
tions that were not appropriate”). 
204 See discussion infra Parts VI–VII. 
205 BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 1-8. 
206 See Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1997) (in-
ternal quotations omitted); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
207 See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1118–20 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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tive,208 and brieºy discusses three additional alternatives that NIH 
deemed unreasonable.209 While there is no mandated number of al-
ternatives that must be discussed in detail, the “rule of reason” suggests 
that this number should be more than one.210 Similarly, an agency’s 
decision to only analyze a single option in detail appears disingenuous 
in light of NEPA’s mandate to foster informed decisionmaking.211
 Thirdly, the BUMC DEIS “considered and subsequently elimi-
nated from further review” three alternatives which NIH determined 
“provided no environmental advantage over the Proposed Action or 
No Action or [did] not meet the purpose and need of the Project.”212 
Two of these alternatives—locating the NBL in lower-density areas 
outside Boston and locating the NBL at other Boston University-
owned sites—represent essentially the same view: a BSL-3/4 labora-
tory should not be built in a densely populated area. In declining to 
give these alternatives detailed analysis, NIH tautologously refers to 
beneªts already present at the BUMC campus.213 The DEIS then 
summarily concludes the discussion by stating, “[f]inally, the alterna-
tive of a location outside Massachusetts or in a lower density area out-
side of Boston are not a feasible alternatives [sic] as they do not meet 
the purpose and need for the Project.”214 A reviewing court could ªnd 
this circular argument unreasonable and, following the lead of a re-
cent holding by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, invalidate the 
BUMC DEIS for failure to address reasonable alternatives.215
 Finally, and perhaps most poignantly, the DEIS states that “NIAID 
selected the BUMC . . . based on multiple factors including review of 
environmental issues, but focused primarily on the scientiªc and tech-
nical merit of the application . . . and on BUMC’s ability to contribute 
to the overall NIAID biodefense research agenda.”216 In another feat of 
circular logic, the “review of environmental issues” that NIH speciously 
claims to have conducted prior to its site selection can only be seen as 
disingenuous, since the NEPA-mandated alternatives review was initi-
ated after the selection was made. As such, a reviewing court could in-
                                                                                                                      
208 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (2004). 
209 See BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 2-1. 
210 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
211 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2000). 
212 See BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 2-31. 
213 See id. at 2-33. 
214 Id. at 2-35. 
215 See Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1997); see 
also supra note 149–50 and accompanying text. 
216 BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 2-32. 
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deed ªnd that NIH did not fulªll its statutory obligation to consider 
project alternatives in its decisionmaking process.217 As the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals observed three decades ago, “the critical agency 
decision must, of course, be made . . . in light of the alternatives, not 
before. Otherwise the process becomes a useless ritual, defeating the 
purpose of NEPA, and rather making a mockery of it.”218
 Alternatively, a reviewing court may validate NIH’s choices of al-
ternatives if NIH effectively argues that the overall goal of Project 
BioShield is to conserve and protect the environment by creating vac-
cines for deadly diseases before terrorists have an opportunity to 
unleash them. Following the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s lead, a 
court could therefore decide that, given the “conservation and preven-
tative goals” of the agency, NIH was not required to conduct in-depth 
analysis of certain alternatives.219 It is also to NIH’s advantage that 
courts ªnd agencies’ purpose and need statements valid three times as 
often as they invalidate them.220 Additionally, some lower courts have 
previously validated EISs discussing in detail only a single alternative.221
B. Risk-Assessment Methodologies May Be Inadequate 
 If a reviewing court does not invalidate the BUMC DEIS on the 
basis of inadequate consideration of project alternatives, it may still 
decide to invalidate it for using inadequate risk-assessment method-
ologies. First, NIH cites a study concluding that the proposed NBL 
presented a “negligible” risk to the public as a factor in determining 
that “locating the facility in a lower density area would not in any way 
reduce the risk to the public.”222 Additionally, although CEQ regula-
tions no longer require it, the BUMC DEIS discusses in detail what it 
claims to be a realistic worst-case scenario.223 Finally, the DEIS brieºy 
                                                                                                                      
217 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) 
(2000). 
218 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 1975). 
219 See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2002). 
220 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
221 See Tongass Conservation Soc’y v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 1137, 1138–39 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
222 See BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 4-9, 2-33. 
223See id. at 4-6 to 4-10, app. 6 (using a private consulting ªrm’s analysis of an anthrax re-
lease in a laboratory with failed air ªlters as a worst-case scenario); supra notes 151–55 and 
accompanying text. Interestingly, this type of analysis was required to achieve state environ-
mental certiªcation, which may explain its inclusion here. See Ellen Roy Herzfelder, Execu-
tive Ofªce of Envtl. Affairs, Certiªcate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft 
Environmental Impact Report 3 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.ace-ej.org/Biolab- 
Web/Biolabdocs/EOEADEIRCertiªcate.pdf. 
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discusses—and then dismisses—ªve other potential risk scenarios as 
presenting “negligible” community risk.224
 Not surprisingly, there has been a backlash from environmental 
groups over NIH’s choice of scientiªc methodologies.225 While plain-
tiffs have an uphill battle in proving that the agency did not properly 
analyze all “reasonably foreseeable” occurrences, the regulations do 
leave room for courts to ªnd NIH’s risk-assessment methodologies in-
adequate.226 It is possible that a reviewing court will see the BSL-3/4 
laboratory materials as analogous to the spent nuclear fuel rods in Si-
erra Club v. Watkins—potentially dangerous offshoots of a nominally 
beneªcial public enterprise.227 In such an instance, the Watkins court’s 
admonition that “[i]t is particularly important that a government 
agency be completely forthright about the risks of a program involving 
radioactive materials, which inspire great fear among many members of 
the public,” would seem equally pertinent to the infectious disease ma-
terials in the present case.228 Thus, a reviewing court may indeed in-
validate the BUMC DEIS for inadequate risk-assessment methodolo-
gies. 
VI. The Project BioShield Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 The set of circumstances predicted in Parts IV and V lead to a 
ªnite number of potential endgames for Project BioShield litigation, 
none of which is beneªcial to both the government and environmen-
talists.229 Because the current outlook is less than ideal, consideration 
of the different historical paths that could have been taken leads to hy-
                                                                                                                      
224 BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 4-11 to 4-15. The ªve scenarios are as follows: (1) a 
laboratory-acquired infection; (2) escape of an infected animal; (3) release of infectious 
materials during transportation; (4) unauthorized removal of biological material; and (5) 
a terrorist-related bombing. Id. 
225 See December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 5. This letter sets out several perceived 
deªciencies in NIH’s analysis, including the use of a BSL-3 pathogen—anthrax—instead of 
a BSL-4 pathogen—such as Ebola—in its models; use of the wrong number of anthrax 
spores per gram; failure to consider the increased susceptibility of some people; failure to 
consider spore dispersal in an urban environment; failure to consider a release of numer-
ous biological pathogens; failure to address soil contamination; failure to consider the 
escape of an infected insect or animal; failure to analyze a release during transit; and fail-
ure to include a threat and vulnerability analysis for a terrorist attack on the laboratory. Id. 
at 5-8. 
226 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2004); supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
227 See 808 F. Supp. 852, 869 (D.D.C. 1991); see also supra notes 161–63 and accompany-
ing text. 
228 See Watkins, 808 F. Supp. at 869. 
229 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
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potheses regarding the possibility of better outcomes in the future.230 
To that end, a classic game theory model demonstrates that the current 
negative effects of NIH’s historical decision to not complete a thorough 
PEIS necessitate the modernization of PEISs going forward.231
A. The Present: An Unacceptable Status Quo 
 Assuming the above analyses hold true, a PEIS will not be man-
dated and the site-speciªc EIS may or may not be invalidated.232 Thus, 
there appears to be three viable endgames to Project BioShield litiga-
tion: (1) the EIS is validated and the NBL is built; (2) the EIS is in-
validated and NIH chooses to build elsewhere; and (3) the EIS is in-
validated but NIH chooses to pursue building at the BUMC site by 
ªling a supplemental EIS that is later accepted.233
 Each of these outcomes is unattractive to at least one of the par-
ticipants. In the ªrst option, environmentalists lose because the NBL 
is built in a densely populated area. In the second option, the gov-
ernment loses because it has wasted time and money on an unsuccess-
ful project. In the third option, environmentalists lose because the lab 
is built in a densely populated area and the government loses because 
it wasted time and money in having to prepare a supplemental EIS. 
 In the absence of a mutually beneªcial option, both government 
agencies and environmental groups willingly roll the dice—however 
weighted they may be—with courts that have been historically hostile 
to NEPA.234 In light of the unavoidable loss of time and money in-
volved, this present situation is less than ideal. 
B. The Past: The Optimal Prisoner’s Dilemma Outcome  
Was Realistically Unattainable 
 Although the current endgames mentioned above are immutable 
owing to previous decisions made or foregone, examining where al-
ternate paths could have led engenders consideration of disparate 
viewpoints and lends a sense of urgency to proposals for the future. 
                                                                                                                      
230 See discussion infra Part VI.B–C. 
231 In the last few decades, game theory has blossomed into a widely used decision-
modeling tool. Don Ross, Game Theory, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/gametheory/. 
232 See discussion supra Parts IV, V. 
233 Though theoretically conceivable, two additional outcomes—the EIS is invalidated 
but NIH builds anyway, and the EIS is validated but NIH does not build—are realistically 
unattainable. 
234 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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1. Applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to Project BioShield 
 The predicament faced by the government and environmentalists 
at Project BioShield’s inception can be likened to a well-known non-
zero-sum235 game theory concept: the prisoner’s dilemma.236 This 
models decisions made by two opposing parties, where each party, 
acting in self-interest, will attempt to maximize its own payout despite 
the fact that both parties would be better off if they cooperated.237
 Speciªcally, the post-9/11 government perceived an imminent ter-
rorist threat, and may have thought it reasonable to try to force 
through environmental review its ªrst choice for a BSL-3/4 labora-
tory.238 On the other hand, the prospect of a potential legal victory en-
couraged environmental plaintiffs to ªle lawsuits and stall proceedings 
at every juncture, regardless of the relative reasonableness of the gov-
ernment’s proposed actions. Given the circumstances as they existed at 
the time, the government’s and the potential plaintiffs’ decisions alike 
were both rational.239
 As in the classic prisoner’s dilemma problem, there are four po-
tential outcomes: (1) NIH does not complete a PEIS and environ-
mental groups sue; (2) NIH does not complete a PEIS but environ-
mental groups decide not to sue; (3) NIH completes a PEIS but 
                                                                                                                      
235 Zero-Sum, in Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/zero-sum (last visited May 7, 
2006). Zero-sum games, such as tic-tac-toe or poker, are games where it is impossible for 
both players to win; what one player loses, the other gains. Id. In nonzero-sum games, on 
the other hand, there may be an optimal solution that beneªts both players. Id. 
236 For a thorough discussion of this classic problem, see Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/prisoner-dilemma/. As the author details, 
the standard problem involves two bank robbery suspects placed in separate jail cells, 
where a prosecutor tells them each in turn: 
You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accom-
plice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony 
to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accom-
plice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the 
time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I’ll see to it that you both 
get early parole. If you both remain silent, I’ll have to settle for token sen-
tences on ªrearms possession charges. 
Id. 
237 See id. Couched in terms of the classic prisoner scenario, it is seen that “whatever 
the other [prisoner] does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the out-
come obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have 
obtained had both remained silent.” Id. 
238 See Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997). 
239 Importantly, the prisoner’s dilemma model does not rely on one side being morally 
“right.” See Ross, supra note 231. 
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environmental groups sue regardless; and (4) NIH completes a PEIS 
and environmental groups do not sue.240
2. The Optimal Outcome 
 Although this last outcome—NIH completes a PEIS and envi-
ronmental groups do not sue—appears to be a mutually advantageous 
solution, does prisoner’s dilemma analysis conªrm it as the optimal 
outcome?241 A situation where both the government and environmen-
talists receive what they want with relatively low costs and few delays 
would beneªt both sides. For NIH, this entails the permitting and 
construction of an NBL with minimal legal delays, while the environ-
ment is better off if NIH initially proposes an NBL sited in a less 
densely populated area.242 Had NIH chosen to prepare a thorough 
PEIS—one that was tiered and included candid risk assessment and 
alternatives analyses—the optimal outcome may have been 
reached.243
 The ªrst tier of a thorough PEIS would include a genuine analy-
sis of the inherent risks posed when working closely with organisms 
such as Ebola and diseases such as SARS. With the statutory goal of 
informed environmental decisionmaking in mind, such an analysis 
would realistically analyze the probabilities of a wide variety of acci-
dent scenarios, rather than summarily concluding that a few relatively 
benign scenarios would have “negligible” impacts.244
 Had it conducted this sincere risk assessment, NIH would have 
approached the second phase of the tiering process—alternatives 
analysis and site selection—fully informed of the unlikely, but devas-
tating, effects of an accidental release. Armed with this knowledge, 
                                                                                                                      
240 Looking at the situation as it currently presents itself, it is almost certain that the 
ªrst potential outcome will come to pass because NIH has already chosen not to complete 
a PEIS and environmental groups have given every indication that they will attempt to 
block proposed BSL-3/4 laboratories with litigation. See discussion supra Part IV. 
241 Rating certain outcomes as better than others—thus recognizing the existence of 
an optimal outcome—is essential for non-zero-sum game theory analysis. See generally Zero-
Sum, supra note 235. 
242 Not all environmentalists would necessarily be pleased, however. Some critics claim 
that researching these dangerous diseases is never a good idea, regardless of where the 
research is conducted. See Anna Badkhen, Fear Follows Plan to Build More Deadly-Disease Labs, 
S.F. Chron., Aug. 22, 2004, at A1. This Note adopts the less-extreme view that the envi-
ronment as a whole is better off with NBLs and the vaccines that may result, if the labora-
tories can be sited in areas with low population densities. 
243 See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part III. 
244 See supra notes 58, 224 and accompanying text. 
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the agency’s purpose and need statement would not be site speciªc.245 
Instead, it would reºect NIH’s desire to ªnd the best possible location 
for the NBL by balancing the “physical and intellectual capital” pre-
sent in the Boston area with the recognized environmental and public 
health risk of siting an NBL in a densely populated area.246 This sce-
nario would likely result in the selection of a less densely populated 
area outside of Boston as NIH’s preferred alternative. 
 This set of events perfectly mirrors the optimal outcome of the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma247—if one additional assumption is made. In 
this optimal scenario, the government makes a cooperative concession 
to environmentalists by taking the time and money to effectively ana-
lyze the situation. One must then assume that this compromise results 
in a cooperative concession from environmentalists—recognition of 
NIH’s comprehensive analyses, and their subsequent decision not to 
litigate the agency’s informed selection of the less densely populated 
location as its preferred alternative. Thus, the Project BioShield pris-
oner’s dilemma demonstrates that the true optimal outcome would 
only have been attainable if both sides had cooperated effectively and 
conceded accordingly. 
3. The Optimal Outcome Was—and Is—Realistically Unattainable 
 Faced with the practical certainty of legal action regardless of the 
perceived diligence of their selection processes, agencies have every 
incentive to spend less time and money on their environmental analy-
ses and attempt to force through their ªrst choice without a PEIS. En-
vironmentalists have reacted in turn by further marginalizing their 
role with ever-more-radical attempts to be heard.248 With no incentive 
to arrive at a mutually beneªcial outcome, neither the government 
nor environmentalists have reason to stray from their self-serving paths; 
thus, the sub-optimal status quo persists. 
                                                                                                                      
245 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
246 BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 2-33. 
247 See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text. 
248 See Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘I Have a Nightmare’, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2005, at A15 
(“[E]nvironmental groups are too often alarmists. They have an awful track record, so 
they’ve lost credibility with the public. Some do great work, but others can be the left’s 
equivalents of the neocons: brimming with moral clarity and ideological zeal, but empty of 
nuance.”). 
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C. The Future: Congress, CEQ, and the Courts Should Strive  
for the Best Possible Outcome 
 Recognizing that the optimal outcome exists but is realistically un-
attainable, a mechanism should be adopted that pushes both agencies 
and environmental plaintiffs towards the best possible outcome. Cur-
rently, neither NEPA nor the CEQ regulations clearly mandate the use 
of PEISs,249 and courts are loathe to impose such a requirement.250 In 
this instance, however, the situation resulting from NIH’s initial prepa-
ration of a thorough PEIS, coupled with the concomitant decrease in 
both the number and viability of impending environmental lawsuits, a 
thorough PEIS would have been as close to the optimal outcome as 
possible. Going forward, the current sub-optimal status quo need not 
be tacitly condoned by the absence of statutory, regulatory, and judicial 
guidance forcing the completion of thorough PEISs. 
VII. Recommendations for Modernizing PEISs 
 In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the U.S. Supreme Court did not stop at 
merely legitimizing PEISs of national scope; it went further in recog-
nizing that PEISs were actually required in some instances.251 How-
ever, a problem arises where, as in the current situation, despite the 
fact that prior completion of a PEIS would have been advantageous, 
an agency is able to forego such an action by pressing ahead with site-
speciªc EISs.252 Continued acceptance of this frequent practice realis-
tically means that PEISs can always be avoided. For PEISs to reach 
their potential as planning tools, Congress, CEQ, and the courts must 
modernize them by clarifying the vague aspects of the PEIS process. 
A. Congress Should Amend NEPA 
 Congress should amend NEPA to legislatively recognize PEISs, 
state exactly when they should be implemented, and establish the ex-
act levels of analysis necessary for their validation.253 Unfortunately, 
Congress has shown little desire to amend NEPA since its inception, 
and recent amendments have only diminished the statute’s environ-
                                                                                                                      
249 See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
250 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
251 See 427 U.S. 390, 398–415 (1976); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
252 See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
253 For a detailed discussion of recommended changes to project alternatives and risk-
assessment methodologies, see discussion infra Part VII.B. 
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mental purview.254 Despite its aversion to environmental action, Con-
gress should see a potential NEPA PEIS amendment for what it would 
be: a worthwhile step toward achieving the best possible outcome in 
future environmental reviews.255
B. CEQ Should Promulgate Clarifying Regulations 
 CEQ should promulgate new regulations in order to clarify cer-
tain aspects of the PEIS process. The need for revised PEIS regula-
tions was conveyed to CEQ in a September 2003 report issued by the 
NEPA Task Force.256 Chapter 3 of this report focuses speciªcally on 
tiering and PEISs, stating that they are “valuable decisionmaking tools” 
that agencies do not take advantage of often enough.257
 Indeed, James L. Connaughton, the chairman and sole member 
of CEQ, recognized the importance of PEIS modernization in an ad-
dress he gave a few months before the report was published.258 In an 
article adapted from his address, Connaughton stated that “we are on 
the cusp of a new future for this whole idea of environmental review,” 
and posed an important question about the future of PEISs 
speciªcally: “The question we must ªnd an answer to now is how to 
pull environmental and risk assessments together in such a way to 
create a more programmatic view of planning and development 
. . . .”259
 Perhaps in a nod to CEQ’s poor reputation among environ-
mental groups,260 the NEPA Task Force report proposed that the onus 
                                                                                                                      
254 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 4, div. I, title 
III, 118 Stat. 3332 (2004) (demonstrating the Republican-controlled Congress’s annual 
limitation of CEQ membership to a single advisor since 1997); Floyd D. Spence National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 317, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654 
(2000) (stating that neither NEPA nor CEQ regulations shall require a PEIS for low-level 
military ºight training). 
255 See discussion supra Part VI.B.4. 
256 See generally NEPA Task Force, Report to the Council on Environmental 
Quality: Modernizing NEPA Implementation (2003), available at http://ceq.eh.doe. 
gov/ntf/report/ªnalreport.pdf. 
257 Id. at 35. 
258 James L. Connaughton, Keynote Address, Modernizing the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act: Back to the Future, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2003). 
259 Id. at 3, 9. 
260 Prior to his appointment as CEQ Chairman, Mr. Connaughton was an environ-
mental lawyer who “represented General Electric Co. and the mining company Asarco Inc. 
in battles with the EPA over Superfund cleanup requirements. He also lobbied on behalf 
of Alcoa Inc., the Chemical Manufacturers Association and other prominent corporate 
interests with pollution problems.” Eric Pianin, In Pollution Debates, Bush’s Man Seeks Har-
mony Amid the Storm, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 2003, at A13. 
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of answering the chairman’s question be delegated to a diverse Fed-
eral Advisory Committee in order to “foster a nonfederal perspective 
and encourage public trust.”261 This committee would be charged 
with proposing regulations to “clearly deªne” both the range of alter-
natives and the depth of analysis required in NEPA documents.262 Im-
portantly, the report also recognizes that early involvement of all con-
cerned parties is essential to a properly prepared PEIS.263
 These recommendations are clearly relevant and should be 
adopted by CEQ. What the report fails to mention, however, is the need 
for regulations that state exactly when a PEIS must be pursued for each 
speciªc type of project. This would clarify the Kleppe Court’s holding 
that PEISs are sometimes mandatory.264 Additionally, it would usher 
the two relevant parties toward the best possible prisoner’s dilemma 
outcome: agencies would complete a PEIS only when required, and 
environmentalists would not sue every time an agency declined to 
complete a PEIS.265 Agencies must know exactly when to begin the 
PEIS analysis; without this impetus, the NEPA Task Force’s compelling 
recommendations on how to thoroughly complete a PEIS may never be 
implemented. 
 Any meaningful CEQ overhaul of the PEIS regulations would 
therefore require all three of these innovations. Chronologically, an 
agency must ªrst know whether completion of a PEIS is required for 
the speciªc action in question. If so, then the agency involved must be 
required to begin the PEIS process right away by requesting input 
from a wide range of affected parties at the outset. Finally, once those 
discussions have begun, the agency must know exactly what levels of 
analysis the PEIS must contain—both in terms of ranges of alterna-
tives and risk-assessment methodologies. 
C. The Courts Should Encourage Agencies to Consider PEISs 
 Early on in the environmental review process, courts should be 
vigilant in demanding that agencies have valid reasons for deciding to 
forego PEISs. Although the deferential standard of review will con-
tinue to constrain courts from mandating PEISs in many circum-
                                                                                                                      
261 NEPA Task Force Report, supra note 256, at 39. 
262 Id. at 42–43. 
263 See id. at 43. 
264 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
265 An initial lawsuit under such a scheme would be a one-time hurdle, easily cleared 
due to the Supreme Court’s stated desire to give CEQ regulations substantial deference. 
See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). 
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stances,266 the subjective nature of this test allows courts to censure 
those agencies that refuse outright to consider PEISs, as well as those 
that arbitrarily decline their use. Timely enforcement of these re-
quirements will assure that an agency cannot preempt the informed 
use of a PEIS by beginning site-speciªc EISs before a court has had 
the chance to appraise the situation. 
 As with Project BioShield, however, judicial review is not always 
initiated before work on site-speciªc EISs has commenced. Nonethe-
less, well-reasoned court rulings on the validity of EISs may prospec-
tively inºuence agencies’ consideration of PEISs as planning tools. If 
hastily conceived EISs were routinely invalidated—either for failure to 
adequately consider project alternatives or for inadequate risk-
assessment methodologies—then initial, project-level environmental 
evaluations are more likely to be implemented. Because this “in-
formed” decisionmaking would result in more thorough site-selection 
procedures, less time and money would be spent by agencies on court 
proceedings. In sum, effective judicial enforcement of EIS require-
ments would eventually cause agencies to recognize PEISs as valuable 
planning tools. 
D. A Necessary First Step 
 All things considered, the executive branch is in the best position 
to make effective changes to the ways its agencies approach PEISs, for 
agencies are less likely to question instructions if they come from CEQ. 
Additionally, while there currently exists a vast body of NEPA common 
law, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to reduce the burdens of 
environmental litigation by broadcasting its preference that CEQ’s 
regulations be given substantial deference. 
 It is possible, of course, that CEQ is content with the status 
quo.267 In that case, the courts should use Project BioShield litigation 
as a starting point for taking a stand on agencies’ PEIS reluctance. By 
invalidating the BUMC EIS for either inadequate consideration of 
alternatives or inadequate risk-assessment methodologies, the courts 
can take a necessary ªrst step toward change. 
                                                                                                                      
266 See Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001); see also discus-
sion supra Part II.C.2. 
267 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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Conclusion 
 In light of public apprehension regarding the inherent dangers 
posed by BSL-3/4 pathogens, litigation is likely to result from siting 
controversies over proposed Project BioShield laboratories. Given pro-
fessed executive and legislative approval for the swift proliferation of 
vaccine-producing laboratory space, environmental opposition should 
focus on the need for these laboratories to be sited in areas with com-
paratively low population densities, rather than on the desire to halt all 
construction indeªnitely. 
 Though regulatory language and a line of appellate court cases 
support their assertions, environmental plaintiffs nationwide are unlikely 
to prevail in their claims that NIH failed to complete a PEIS, because 
courts will probably defer to NIH’s desire not to waste agency resources. 
On the other hand, a reviewing court may invalidate NIH’s site-speciªc 
BUMC EIS—and any signiªcantly comparable EISs—for either failure to 
adequately consider project alternatives or use of inadequate risk-
assessment methodologies. 
 Unfortunately, the current range of potential litigation endgames 
does not include an option that is mutually beneªcial to agency and 
environmentalist alike. In an effort to effectuate such an outcome go-
ing forward, future actors must ªrst scrutinize the historical underpin-
nings supporting the present stalemate. Applying the prisoner’s dilemma 
game theory model to the circumstances present at the inception of 
Project BioShield shows that, although an optimal outcome existed, it 
was realistically unattainable. 
 Looking ahead, Congress, CEQ, and the courts should strive to 
make the best possible outcome—initial agency completion of a thor-
ough PEIS, coupled with the attendant decrease in both the number 
and efªcacy of potential environmental lawsuits—a reality for similarly 
situated agencies. Unfortunately, legislation clarifying NEPA processes 
is unlikely to materialize any time soon. As a result, CEQ is in the best 
position to make effective changes to the PEIS process through the 
promulgation of clarifying regulations. Such regulations should: (1) 
detail the types and amounts of analysis necessary for a given category 
of PEISs; (2) require early communication between all affected parties 
in PEIS proceedings; and (3) state exactly when a PEIS must be pur-
sued in the ªrst place. Although cataloging the necessary changes to 
agencies’ PEIS practices will no doubt be a Herculean task for CEQ, its 
one-time occurrence is certainly preferable to the Sisyphean process 
undertaken by agencies attempting to navigate the current regulatory 
morass. 
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 Should CEQ remain reticent, impending lawsuits would allow 
courts to take the ªrst step toward PEIS rehabilitation by invalidating 
site-speciªc BSL-3/4 EISs for either inadequate consideration of al-
ternatives or inadequate risk-assessment methodologies. As prisoner’s 
dilemma analysis demonstrates, Project BioShield litigation offers the 
judiciary the opportunity to censure the executive branch’s PEIS ne-
glect in an effort to stimulate regulatory clariªcation. 
